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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In 2010, Samuel Glenn was charged with DUI.

The State charged an

enhancement for one or more felony convictions within fifteen years, which was
premised on a case from 2001. However, Mr. Glenn had successfully completed his
period of probation from the 2001 case and had, in 2007, moved the district court to
grant him relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.

The district court granted that motion,

allowed Mr. Glenn to withdraw his guilty plea, and dismissed the 2001 case. As such,
Mr. Glenn moved to dismiss the 2010 indictment because it was premised on a nonexistent conviction. The district court denied that motion based on the Court of Appeals'
recent decision in State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010).
However, substantively, the Reed decision is directly contradictory to several
Idaho Supreme Court decisions, including United States v. Sharp, State v. Parkinson,

State v. Robinson, and Manners v. State Bd. of Veterinary Medicine. 1

The Reed

Court also engaged in an exercise of statutory interpretation, delving into the perceived
legislative intent behind I.C. § 19-2604, which was improper because I.C. § 19-2604 is
unambiguous. As a result of that unnecessary exercise in statutory construction, the

Reed decision also runs afoul of the Idaho Supreme Court's admonitions regarding
statutory construction, which it recently reaffirmed in Verska (see note 1, supra).
Because of the erroneous nature of the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed,
Mr. Glenn respectfully requests that it be overruled, and, as a result, that the district

Sharp, 145 Idaho 403 (2008); Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825 (2007) abrogated on other
grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg 'I Med. etr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011);
Robinson, 143 Idaho 306 (2006); Manners, 107 Idaho 950 (1985).
1

1

court's ruling on the motion to dismiss in this case, which was based on Reed, be
reversed and Mr. Glenn's case remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Glenn has filed a
contemporaneous motion requesting the Idaho Supreme Court retain this appeal, so
that it may do just that.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2001, Mr. Glenn pled guilty to felony DUI. 2 (See Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4i He was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with
one year fixed, although that sentence was suspended for a five-year period of
probation. (PSI, p.47; see Augmentation - Court Minutes from August 8, 2001.) Upon
satisfactorily completing that period of probation, Mr. Glenn moved the district court in
2007 to reduce his charge to a misdemeanor. (R., pp.45-46.)
The district court noted that, based on the language of I.C. § 19-2604,4 the relief
Mr. Glenn requested (to reduce his charge to a misdemeanor) was unavailable, since
the district court did not retain jurisdiction in his case.
Minutes from March 21, 2007; pp.A24-A27, infra.)

(See Augmentation - Court

Instead, the district court treated

Mr. Glenn's motion as a general petition for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.

In this case, the district court took judicial notice of that case file, which is CR-FE2001-22 (formerly H0100022). (R., p.77.) The portions of that record which were
definitely relevant to the issue now on appeal have been augmented to the appellate
record. (Order [Granting In Part and Denying In Part Motion to Augment], (Sept. 11,
2012).)
3 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"GlennPSI." Included in this file is the PSI report as well as all the documents attached
thereto (police reports, addendums to the PSI, etc.).
4 As several versions of the relevant statutes are discussed in this brief, Mr. Glenn has
provided an addendum pursuant to I.A.R. 35(f) containing reproductions of the statutes.
The addendum is individually paginated using the identifier "A," so that the first page of
the addendum is designated "A 1."
2

2

(Augmentation - Court Minutes from March 21, 2007.)

The district court granted

Mr. Glenn's motion, ordering:
the defendant's
action is finally
Thomas Glenn
citizenship. . .
defendant with
law ....

plea of guilty shall be, and hereby is, set aside and this
dismissed and the defendant discharged . . . . Samuel
shall be, and hereby is, restored the full rights of
. This order of expungement is intended to provide
the maximum degree of relief permissible under Idaho

(R., p.46.)

Subsequently, in 2010, the State charged Mr. Glenn with a new felony DUI.
(R., pp.1 0-11, 35-36.)

It also sought to enhance h is sentence based on its assertion

that he had a prior felony conviction under the same statute within the past fifteen
years.5 (See, e.g., R., p.36.) However, the only possible basis for the enhancement
was the dismissed 2001 DUI.

(See Augmentation - Court Minutes from March 21,

2007; PSI, pp.3-5 (Mr. Glenn's criminal record).)

Mr. Glenn moved to dismiss the

indictment in this case based on the fact that, pursuant to the district court's order in
2007, the guilty plea in that case had been withdrawn and that case had been
dismissed. (R., p.43.)

5 This allegation was made pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(9) (see p.A8, infra). (R., p.78.)
I.C. § 18-8005(9) provides:
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of this
section, any person who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a
felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, a felony
violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, a violation of
the provisions of section 18-8006, Idaho Code, a violation of the
provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form
of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming
foreign criminal felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years pleads
guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 188004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced
pursuant to subsection (6) of this section.

3

At a hearing on the motion to dismiss the indictment in this case, defense
counsel conceded that the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed was on point, but
contended that Reed should be overruled. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp.8-11;6 see also R., pp.59-60.)
After receiving briefing and argument from both parties, the district court denied
Mr. Glenn's motion based on the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed. (R., pp.77-79.)
In order to preserve the issue for appeal, Mr. Glenn entered a conditional guilty plea.
(Tr., Vo1.2, p.5, L.20 - p.6, L.8.) The district court accepted that plea. (Tr., Vo1.2, p.20,
Ls.19-20.)

It subsequently sentenced Mr. Glenn to a unified term of ten years, with

three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.104-07.) Mr. Glenn appealed from
that order, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss. (R., pp.116-18.)

6 The transcripts in this case are contained in two separately bound and paginated
volumes. To promote clarity, the volume containing the transcript of the hearing for the
motion to dismiss (held on May 27, 2011) will be referred to as "Vol. 1," and the volume
containing transcripts of the entry of plea (held on June 10, 2011) and sentencing (held
on December 9, 2011) hearings will be referred to as "VoI.2."

4

ISSUE
Whether State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), should be overruled, such that it
was error to allow the State to enhance Mr. Glenn's sentence for driving under the
influence because he has "pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of
[the relevant code sections], notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld
judgment(s) ... within fifteen (15) years" where the necessary prior convictions no
longer exists as the prior guilty plea had been withdrawn and the case dismissed.

5

ARGUMENT

State v. Reed, 149 Idaho 901 (Ct. App. 2010), Should Be Overruled, Such That It
Was Error To Allow The State To Enhance Mr. Glenn's Sentence For Driving Under
The Influence Because He Had "Pled Guilty Or Has Been Found Guilty Of A Felony
Violation Of [The Relevant Code Sections], Notwithstanding The Form Of The
Judgment(s) Or Withheld Judgment(s) ... Within Fifteen (15) Years" Where The
Necessary Prior Convictions No Longer Exists As The Prior Guilty Plea Had Been
Withdrawn And The Case Dismissed

A.

Introduction
The district court's decision to deny Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss was in error

because it did not adhere to established Idaho Supreme Court precedent on the issue.
While the district court and counsel below were correct that Reed was not only on-point,
but had similar facts to Mr. Glenn's case, the reliance on that decision to deny
Mr. Glenn's motion was in error because the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed is in
direct conflict with several recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court, including,
but not limited to, Sharp, Parkinson, Robinson, and Manners. Furthermore, the Court
of Appeals' effort at statutory interpretation in Reed was unnecessary, for the reasons
set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Verska.

Because of these significant

shortcomings, Mr. Glenn requests that this Court overrule Reed.

In addition, he

requests this Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion to dismiss and
remand the case for further proceedings.

B.

State Of The Law
The question at issue in this case is whether, in enhancing a sentence for DUI

under I.C. § 18-8005(9), a court may still treat a guilty plea that has been withdrawn in a
case that has been dismissed as a predicate prior offense.

6

One of the Idaho Supreme Court's first considerations of this kind of question
occurred in State v. Barwick, 94 Idaho 139 (1971).

In the relevant portion of that

opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the State could impeach the
defendant with evidence of a prior judgment of conviction from Florida.

Barwick, 94

Idaho at 143. That prior judgment had been vacated and an order of nolfo prosequi had
been entered.? Id.

The Idaho Supreme Court determined that the district court had

erred in admitting that evidence because there was no valid conviction with which the
State could properly impeach the defendant; once the case was dismissed, the
conviction was "a nullity and the effect [was] as if it had never been rendered at all." Id.
Relying on the invalid, null judgment necessitated a reversal of the defendant's
conviction. Id.
In a related context, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho was
asked to consider the effect granting relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604 would have on a
defendant's record.

United States v. Locke, 409 F.Supp. 600 (1976).

That court

determined that "compliance with I.C. § 19-2604 would result in a guilty plea and
judgment being erased where an appropriate order is entered." Id. at 605. However, it
found that such an order was lacking in that particular case. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court specifically addressed that same question in 1985.
Manners, 107 Idaho 950. In that case, Dr. Manners, a licensed veterinarian, had pled
guilty to felony delivery of a controlled substance, for which he was sentenced to a fiveyear period of probation. Manners, 107 Idaho at 951. Upon successfully completing

? The order of nollo prosequi indicated that the State was unwilling to prosecute the
case and served to dismiss the case without prejudice. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 406
(interpreting Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143, citing Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 SO.2d 857, 859
(Fla.1957), and Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835,186 So. 203 (1939)).

7

that period of probation, the district court allowed Dr. Manners to withdraw his guilty
plea and enter a plea of not guilty. Id. The district court then dismissed the charges
against Dr. Manners. Id. After he received that relief, the licensing board decided to
revoke Dr. Manners's license, premised on that vacated felony conviction.

Id.

The

Idaho Supreme Court first recognized that the suspended sentence constituted a
conviction. Id. (citing State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 278 (1978). However, it applied
the rule established in Barwick - '''where a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity,
and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all" - and determined that
the BalWick rule applies when a district court affords a defendant relief pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2604. Id. at 952. (citing favorably Locke, 409 F.Supp. 600). In reaching that
decision, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the idea that certain penalties and
disabilities might still affect the defendant after relief had been granted.

Id.

To that

point, it stated:
We disagree with this view. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 a court clearly has
the authority to finally dismiss a case and discharge a defendant where
such an act is compatible with the public interest, and defendant has
satisfactorily completed the terms of probation. The final dismissal of a
case 'shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil rights.
I.C. §19-2604(1). Nowhere in that statute is there language which limits or
conditions the rights with defendant regains.
Id. As a result, the district court reversed the board's decision to revoke Dr. Manners's

license. Id. In doing so, the Manners Court established the fundamental rule regarding
relief awards pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604: the conviction which is vacated becomes
non-existent in the history of the case and is to be treated as if it had never existed at
all. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court revisited this issue in State v. Bever, 118 Idaho 80
(1990).

In that case, the Court was asked to consider whether multiple charged

8

violations in the absence of actual convictions or guilty pleas of I.C. § 18-8004 (OUI)
were sufficient to justify an enhanced penalty pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005. Id. at 80-81.
The Idaho Supreme Court examined the language of I.C. § 18-8005(3), which, at that
time, read:

"Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of three (3) or more

violations of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code ... , within five (5) years,
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), shall be guilty of a
felony; .... " Id. at 81 (compare pp.A7-A 12, infra). The Court found that language to be
ambiguous.

Id.

After engaging in the necessary statutory construction, the Idaho

Supreme Court determined that: "In reviewing I.C. § 18-8005 in its entirety we conclude
that I.C. § 18-8005(3) must be read to proscribe three guilty pleas or findings of guilty
within a five year period." Id. at 82. As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the
district court's denial of that defendant's motion to dismiss the enhancement.

Id.

In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that there must be a valid event of
conviction on the defendant's record in order for it to be a sufficient basis for a
subsequent deprivation.

See id.; compare BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107

Idaho at 952.
Therefore, the rule at the time the Court of Appeals considered State v. Deitz,
120 Idaho 755 (Ct. App. 1991), was that, in order for a prior conviction to be available
as a predicate felony for a subsequent punishment, there must be a valid event of
conviction on that person's record, and a conviction vacated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604
was not available for such purposes.

See BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143, Manners, 107

Idaho at 952; Bever, 118 Idaho at 82.

It was under this precedent that the Court of

Appeals was asked to consider whether a judgment of conviction which had been
subsequently vacated pursuant to I.C. §19-2604 could nevertheless support a
9

sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005.

Deitz, 120 Idaho at 756.

The Deitz Court did not follow the rule established by the Idaho Supreme Court, and
instead, held that the enhancement was proper because Manners was inapplicable for
two reasons:

(1) Dr. Manners had actually been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea

before the case was dismissed, while Mr. Deitz's case had only been dismissed
(his guilty plea was never withdrawn); and (2) the legislative purpose underlying both
I.C. § 18-8005 and I.C. § 19-2604 was to promote the defendant's rehabilitation and
recidivism, and therefore, I.C. § 19-2604 could not grant relief where doing so would
undermine the effects promoted by I.C. § 18-8005. Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757-58. The
Deitz Court found that the decision in In re France, 38 627, 631-32 (1928) (holding that

"this [provision allowing for dismissal of charges] and other humane provisions now
generally recognized are not intended to apply to habitual criminals .... ") (emphasis

added)) meant that I.C. §19-2604 could not be used to the extent argued by Mr. Deitz.
With its decision in Deitz, the Court of Appeals broke from the established Idaho
Supreme Court precedent. s Since then, it has furthered that division.
For example, in 2000, the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant
could be exempted from the sex offender registration requirements of I.C. § 18-8304
upon receiving relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 20
(Ct. App. 2000). In that case, the withheld judgment for statutory rape was conditionally

Former Judge Walters dissented from the majority's decision, recognizing that the
Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Manners meant that once relief was granted pursuant
to I.C. § 19-2604, "the conviction is 'erased' and becomes 'non-existent.'" Deitz, 120
Idaho at 758 (Walters, J., dissenting) (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952). Judge
Walters reminded that Court of Appeals that the application of the rule established by
Manners meant that the prior "conviction" could not support the sentencing
enhancement, and that the ambiguity in I.C. §18-8005 should be construed in the
defendant's favor, meriting a reversal of the district court's decisions. Id.
10
8

dismissed based upon the defendant's immediate enlistment in the army and successful
completion of a tour of duty. Id. at 18. The Court of Appeals, comparing the situation to
that in Deitz, found that allowing relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 to remove the
defendant from the registration requirement would undermine the purpose of I.C. § 188304 and, therefore, could not be a valid interpretation of the statutes. Id. at 21. There
were also provisions in I. C. §§ 18-8301, et. seq., which served to exempt the
registration requirement from the relief afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. See id.
As in Deitz, in Perkins, one member of the panel disagreed with the majority,
reminding the Court of Appeals of the rule governing relief awards pursuant to I.C. § 192604, to which the Court of Appeals was not adhering. Id. at 22-23 (Schwartzman, J.,
specially concurring). Judge Schwartzman only concurred in the result because there
was only a conditional dismissal order; no formal dismissal order was ever enacted.
Regardless, Judge Schwartzman declared:
Were the original plea of guilty set aside and the case fully and finally
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604(1), thus completing the statutory
A true
expungement process, I would vote differently herein.
expungement would leave no plea of guilty or finding of guilt upon which
the Sexual Offender Registration Act could hang its jurisdictional hat.
Id. (emphasis in original). As Judge Schwartzman pointed out, the rule remained that a

relief grant pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 meant that vacated conviction and dismissed
case could not be used as a predicate to a future punishment.
Despite the Court of Appeals' decision in Perkins, the Idaho Legislature still
found it necessary to amend I.C. § 19-2604 in 2006 so that I.C. § 19-2604 would not
release any person from the registration requirements of I.C. § 18-8304. 2006 Idaho
Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (see pp.A24-25, infra); see State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho 580,
581 (2011). This would suggest that the Idaho Legislature felt that the Perkins decision
11

was on shaky ground, and that relief afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 was able to
relieve a person of the registration requirements. It does not seem necessary for the
Legislature to amend the law if the Perkins decision were correct.
In 2005, the Court of Appeals enlarged the gulf between its analysis and the rule
established by the Idaho Supreme Court.

In State v. Woodbury, 141 Idaho 547

(Ct. App. 2005), the defendant claimed he had not been adequately informed that, as a
consequence of his guilty plea and withheld judgment, he would be subject to future
penalties, and so moved to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 548. The Court of Appeals,
in dicta, declared that relief afforded pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 would only partially
cleanse a defendant's record, but would still be available as a prior conviction in various
situations, including disqualification from possessing a liquor license and enhancement
of future penalties for DUI.

Id. at 549.

With this statement, the Court of Appeals

highlighted the break in analysis between its decisions and those in Bever and
Manners, which had held the opposite.
Despite these inteNening decisions from the Court of Appeals, the Idaho
Supreme Court has continued to apply the rule it set forth in Barwick, Manners, and
Bever. For example, even though the Court of Appeals held in Deitz that there was a
notable difference between the situation where a guilty plea was explicitly withdrawn
prior to dismissal of the case, and the situation where the guilty plea was not explicitly
withdrawn prior to dismissal of the case, the Idaho Supreme Court declared in 2006:
It does not matter what form the leniency takes, be it dismissing charges
or allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea or both. We are not persuaded by
Robinson's attempt to draw a distinction between cases where a district
court sets aside a guilty plea and those where it does not. ... If a case
has been dismissed, there is no longer anything in which a judgment of
conviction can stand; likewise, if a charge has been dismissed there no
longer remains a conviction for that charge. An order purporting to dismiss
12

a criminal case without vacating the conviction is invalid, and a guilty plea
in a criminal case would necessarily be vacated once the dismissal in the
underlying criminal case is final. This is true even if the order does not
expressly state that the plea was being set aside.
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310.

In fact, it effectively abrogated Deitz's analysis as to

whether the Manners rule defines the effect of a relief award pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604:
it does, because the conviction was vacated, and so, was non-existent, unable to be the
foundation for a future deprivation. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court was presented with this issue again the next year
in Parkinson. There, while recognizing some of the underlying conclusions of the Deitz
and Perkins decisions (i.e., I.C. § 19-2604 does not result in a full expungement of the
defendant's record; the conviction is not fully erased, nor is it premised on a finding of
factual innocence), the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed that "[w]here a judgment has
been vacated under this statute, 'it is a nullity, and the effect is as if it had never been
rendered at all,' and there are no limits or conditions on the rights the defendant
regains."

Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825 (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (quoting

Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143)). Therefore, even though the foundational analysis in Deitz

and Perkins might be accurate, their conclusions were not (i.e., those opinions were
abrogated by a subsequent Idaho Supreme Court decision) - the rule, established in
Barwick and Manners, remains the same:

a prior conviction, vacated pursuant to

I.C. § 19-2604, cannot serve as a predicate felony for a subsequent punishment. See
Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828.

Most recently, in 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed that "[a]n outstanding
withheld judgment based on a guilty plea qualifies as a conviction under Idaho law."

Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407 (emphasis added). With that statement, the Idaho Supreme
13

Court reaffirmed that the judgment of conviction must still be validly on the defendant's
record to serve as the predicate felony for a subsequent charge. Id. at 406 (discussing
Barwick, reaffirming that it "stands for the proposition that when a judgment, sentence,

and conviction were vacated ... the defendant does not have a conviction"). As such,
the rule from the Idaho Supreme Court remains that, where a guilty plea has been
withdrawn and the case dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, there is no valid
conviction upon which a subsequent penalty can be predicated.
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals continues to adhere to the abrogated Deitz
rationale to allow exactly that. See, e.g., Reed, 149 Idaho 901. After he successfully
completed a period of probation following a guilty plea to DUI, Mr. Reed petitioned
the district court for relief pursuant to I.C. §19-2604(1). Id. at 902. The district court
granted that motion, ordering "Reed's 'former plea of guilty is unconditionally withdrawn,
and the plea is deemed as though it had never been tendered to or accepted by the
Court, [Reed's] plea of not guilty I reinstated in this matter, and the matter is hereby
dismissed, with prejudice."

Id. at 902.

Subsequently, the State sought to use that

vacated conviction and dismissed case as a predicate felony conviction for a sentencing
enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005. Id. The Court of Appeals, however, relied on
the rule it established in Deitz (which is contrary to that from the Idaho Supreme Court
in Manners, et a/.) and determined that based on its decisions in Deitz, Perkins and
Woodbury, the vacated judgment of conviction and dismissed case could serve as the

predicate offense for a subsequent sentencing enhancement.

Reed, 149 Idaho at

903-04. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its conclusion that both I.C. §§ 18-8005 and
19-2604 were ambiguous, so as to necessitate an examination of the legislative intent
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behind those code sections. 9 See id. at 904. As such, despite the rule established by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Barwick and Manners, which was reaffirmed in Parkinson
and Sharp, the Court of Appeals allowed the dismissed charge to serve as the predicate
felony for a sentencing enhancement. Id. at 904-05.
The evolution of the case law in this area reveals that, under Idaho Supreme
Court precedent, a prior conviction, which has been vacated and the underlying charges
dismissed, may not serve as a predicate felony for subsequent punishments, while
under the contrary Court of Appeals precedent, it may. As such, the Reed decision,
premised on the Court of Appeals' break from the rule established by the Idaho
Supreme court is manifestly wrong (contrary to controlling precedent) and should be
overruled to vindicate the plain, obvious principles of law recognized by the Idaho
Supreme Court in order to remedy continued injustice. See, e.g., State v. Watts, 142
Idaho 230, 232 (2005).

C.

The Decision In Reed Should Be Overruled, As It Is Contrary To Idaho Supreme
Court Precedent, And, As A Result, The District Court's Decision In Mr. Glenn's
Case, Which Was Premised On Reed, Should Be Reversed
Prior to Reed, the Idaho Supreme Court had already established that even H[a]n

outstanding withheld judgment based on a guilty plea qualifies as a conviction under
Idaho law." Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407. As such, outstanding judgments can be the basis
for sentencing enhancements, such as the enhancement found in I.C. § 18-8005(9)
(see pp.A7-A8, infra).

See id.

However, the key language in Sharp was that the

9 The Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity in the relevant portions of I.C. § 18-8005 in
Bever. See Bever, 118 Idaho at 82 (holding that the statute requires valid pleas or
convictions in order to serve as the predicate felony for an enhancement under
I.C. § 18-8005).
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judgment must still be "outstanding" in order for the judgment to qualify as a conviction.
Id.; see also Bever, 118 Idaho at 81 (holding that the statute requires actual events of

conviction, rather than mere assertions of violations).

Sharp's requirement that the

conviction be "outstanding" is in accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's prior
decisions. See, e.g., Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Parkinson,
144 Idaho at 828. According to the Idaho Supreme Court, when such a judgment was
vacated and there was no longer a conviction event, that case could not be the basis for
attacking the defendant's credibility during testimony. Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143. Nor
could such a vacated conviction be the sole basis for a subsequent punishment or
deprivation of civil rights.

Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (reaffirmed in this regard by

Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828).

The reason was that, once the judgment "has been

vacated, i[t] is a nullity and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all.,,10
BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828.

The Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Manners demonstrates the extent of this
rule. 11

In that case, Dr. Manners completed a period of probation following his

conviction via guilty plea. Manners, 107 Idaho at 951.

Upon his motion, the district

court permitted him to withdraw his guilty plea and the case against him was dismissed.

10 Compare, e.g., Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (when the conviction "has been vacated,
i[t] is a nullity and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all") with I.C. § 20525A (providing that, "[u]pon the entry of the order the proceedings in the petitioner's
case shall be deemed never to have occurred .... "). The Idaho Supreme Court has
essentially said that I.C. § 19-2604 has the same effect regarding a criminal record
which the Legislature explicitly permits in regard to juveniles pursuant to I.C. § 20525A. See, e.g., Barkwick 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Parkinson, 144
Idaho at 828. Since the judgment is deemed to never have occurred when relief is
granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, there is no conviction event in Mr. Glenn's record
upon which to bring the enhancement.
11 The procedural facts in Manners are almost identical to those in Mr. Glenn's case.

16

Id.

Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme Court found that in such a scenario, the

conviction and judgment (imposed, suspended, and ultimately withdrawn) was made
null, as if it had never been, and therefore, could not be the basis for the revocation of
Dr. Manners' veterinary license.

Id. at 952.

In doing so, the Idaho Supreme Court

explicitly rejected the contention that relief under I.C. § 19-2604 still left the defendant
open to certain, subsequent punishments:
In a number of states, statutes similar to I.C. § 19-2604 have been
interpreted to erase a conviction and to release defendant from some, but
not all, 'penalties and disabilities.' Disbarment and license revocation are
not among the penalties and disabilities released by discharge from
probation.
We disagree with this view. Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 a court
clearly has authority to finally dismiss a case and discharge defendant
where such an act is compatible with the public interest, and defendant
has satisfactorily completed the terms of probation. The final dismissal of
a case "shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to his civil rights."
I.C. § 19-2604(1). Nowhere in that statute is there language which limits
or conditions the rights which defendant regains.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Instead, the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed

that: "where a judgment has been vacated, it is a nullity, and the effect is as if it had
never been rendered at all." Id. (quoting Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143); see also Locke, 409
F.Supp. at 604 ("[C]ompliance with I.C. § 19-2604 would result in a guilty plea and

judgment being erased where an appropriate order is entered.") (emphasis added).
As in Manners, Mr. Glenn was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea and the case
against him was dismissed. (R., p.46.) Therefore, as in Manners, his conviction was a
nullity, to be treated as non-existent in history. Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; Barwick,
94 Idaho at 143. Additionally, as in Manners, Mr. Glenn had his civil rights restored to
him.

(R., p.46.)

As such, just as in Manners, the reliance on that non-existent
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conviction to justify the subsequent punishment was in error. See Manners, 107 Idaho
at 952.
And even though BalWick and Manners only speak in terms of "judgment," the
rationale clearly extends to the event of conviction as well. Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310
(holding that once a dismissal is final, the district court also must necessarily dismiss
the guilty plea because, otherwise, the order purporting to dismiss the case would be
invalid as a matter of law, and that result is unacceptable); Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828
(recognizing that a conviction is at least partially erased by I.C. § 19-2604 relief, so far
as to be unavailable to be the predicate for a deprivation of civil rights); see also Locke,
409 F.Supp. at 604 (recognizing that relief granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604 erases
both the judgment and the guilty plea); United States v. Bays, 589 F.3d 1035, 1038-39
(9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that, under Parkinson, when a court affords relief pursuant
to I.C. § 19-2604, "the conviction is vacated and becomes a nUllity. It is treated as
though the judgment was never rendered and 'there are no limits or conditions on the
rights defendant regains'" (citing Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 827-28) (emphasis added)).
As such, the only logical conclusion from Manners, et al., is that once the judgment is
vacated and the event of conviction is expressly or impliedly withdrawn, that case
cannot serve as the predicate offense for a sentence enhancement like the one found
in I.C. § 18-8005(9), as was permitted in Mr. Glenn's case.
This means that when relief was granted pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, Mr. Glenn's
conviction (i.e., his guilty plea) and judgment became nullities - to be treated as if
they never existed.

See, e.g., Sharp, 145 Idaho at 406; BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143;

Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; see also State v. Deitz, 120 Idaho 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1991)
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(Walters, J., dissenting).12 Regardless of the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions (and
without discussion of the critical opinions of Sharp and Manners at all), the Court of
Appeals in Reed, held directly contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court's rule, allowing a
subsequent punishment to be premised on a withdrawn plea, vacated judgment, and
dismissed case.

See Reed, 149 Idaho at 904-05.

Because it is directly contrary to

established Idaho Supreme Court precedent, Reed should be overruled. Additionally,
the district court's denial of Mr. Glenn's motion predicated on the erroneous decision in
Reed, should be reversed.

D.

The Decision In Reed Was The Culmination Of The Court Of Appeals' Break
From Idaho Supreme Court Precedent In Deitz, And The Reliance On The
Erroneous Analysis In Deitz Reveals The Need To Overrule Reed
The Court of Appeals attempted to justify its decision in Reed by looking to its

prior decision in Deitz, wherein it had departed from established Idaho Supreme Court
precedent. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-03 (citing Deitz, 120 Idaho 755). In Oeitz, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision because, in its opinion, the critical
inquiry should focus on the determination of guilt, and the dismissal of the first offense
"did not reverse or vacate the determination of Deitz's guilt for purposes of I.C. § 188005(4)."

Id. at 756-58.

It also attempted to distinguish Manners for two reasons:

(1) Dr. Manners was specifically allowed to withdraw his guilty plea before the charges

12 In fact, a bill was submitted to the Idaho House of Representatives which would have
amended I.C. § 19-2604 to state that relief afforded pursuant to that statute would not
expunge the person's record. H.R. 71, 60th Leg. (2009), http://www.legislature.idaho.
gov/legislation/2009/H0071 Bookmark.htm. That language would have supported the
district court's decision. However, that bill failed in a vote in the House. Idaho House of
Representatives, JOURNAL OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL SESSION AND FIRST REGULAR SESSION
OF THE SIXTIETH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1st Sess., at 127 (2009),
http://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2009/journals/hfinal.pdf.
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were dismissed, while Mr. Deitz only had the underlying charges dismissed; and (2) the
legislative intent of the statute would exempt people like Mr. Deitz from the statute. Id.
The Reed Court reaffirmed these rationales. Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-03.

However,

based on Idaho Supreme Court precedent, it is mistaken on both counts.
First, Deitz suggested that Manners was not controlling because Mr. Deitz's
guilty plea had not been changed or withdrawn before the conviction was set aside;
rather, he had just been discharged from probation and the charges dismissed.
Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757; see Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-03 (asserting that any limitation on
Deitz in regard to the need to withdraw the guilty plea has since been removed; it can

be used in a subsequent prosecution regardless of whether the plea was withdrawn).
That perspective is contrary to established Idaho Supreme Court precedent, which
holds that dismissing the case necessarily includes withdrawing the underlying guilty
plea, lest it render the district court's order invalid. See, e.g., Robinson, 143 Idaho at
310.

In Robinson, the Idaho Supreme Court did not adopt the Deitz Court's

perspective, but instead, held to the contrary:
It does not matter what form the leniency takes, be it dismissing charges
or allowing withdrawal of a guilty plea or both. We are not persuaded by
Robinson's attempt to draw a distinction between cases where a district
court sets aside a guilty plea and those where it does not. ... If a case
has been dismissed, there is no longer anything in which a judgment of
conviction can stand; likewise, if a charge has been dismissed there no
longer remains a conviction for that charge. An order purporting to dismiss
a criminal case without vacating the conviction is invalid, and a guilty plea
in a criminal case would necessarily be vacated once the dismissal in the
underlying criminal case is final. This is true even if the order does not
expressly state that the plea was being set aside. 13
13 Even the Court of Appeals has recognized that principle, although it misread the rule
to allow it to invalidate the district court's order, instead of giving the district court's order
the force that was intended when it was entered. Compare State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho
404, 406 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[W]e think that the order at issue here would be invalid for
another reason. The order purports to dismiss the charge against Dorn without vacating
20

Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310. Therefore, the Reed Court's reliance on the Deitz Court's

analysis regarding the need to withdraw the guilty plea is erroneous.

The Idaho

Supreme Court rejected (and effectively abrogated) the Deitz distinction in this
regard. 14 Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310.

Rather, if the charges are dismissed, the

guilty plea is necessarily withdrawn. Id. Continuing to rely on a withdrawn guilty plea is
inappropriate. Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; see Deitz, 120
Idaho at 758 (Walters, C.J., dissenting).

Therefore, since the Deitz analysis was

subsequently abrogated by the Idaho Supreme court in Robinson, the Reed Court erred
in relying on the Deitz analysis in that regard.
Second, the Deitz Court's exercise in statutory construction, which the Reed
Court affirmed and applied, was also erroneous.

The Deitz interpretation, which

allowed for subsequent punishments premised on withdrawn (and thus, non-existent)
convictions, departed from the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. See Deitz,
120 Idaho at 757-58; Reed, 149 Idaho at 904; compare I.C. § 19-2604. The Idaho
Supreme Court has said that, where the statute is unambiguous, exercises in statutory

the conviction entered against him. Such an outcome cannot be legally accomplished.")
(emphasis added)) with Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310 (declaring that the district court's
apparently-deficient order actually does accomplish all that it needed to make it valid).
This is another notable break between the Court of Appeals and Idaho Supreme
Court analyses: were the Court of Appeals decision allowed to trump the Idaho
Supreme Court precedent, than a conviction would continue to exist on the defendant's
record because no valid order could remove it (but see, e.g., Locke, 409 F.Supp. at 604,
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310), whereas, if the Court of Appeals follows the Idaho
Supreme Court precedent, the order granting relief is given its full and intended effect,
the conviction is vacated, and as such, is unavailable to be the predicate felony for a
subsequent punishment. See, e.g., Manners, 107 Idaho at 952.
14 The abrogation of Deitz reveals that the Manners rule should have governed the
result in Deitz, as Judge Walters argued in his dissent. See Deitz, 120 Idaho at 758
(Walters, J., dissenting). Under Manners, the vacated conviction was unavailable as
the necessary predicate felony for the sentencing enhancement. See id.
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interpretation are inappropriate.

Worley Highway Dist. v. Kootenai County, 98 Idaho

925, 928 (1978).15 Idaho Code §19-2604 (as it was written when Mr. Glenn received
relief in 2007) was unambiguous. (See pp.A24-A27, infra.)
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has
been withheld, upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory
showing that the defendant has at all times complied with the terms
and conditions upon which he was placed on probation ... the court
may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause
for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or
conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge
the defendant; and this shall apply to the cases in which defendants
have been convicted and granted probation by the court before this law
goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of
restoring the defendant to his civil rights.
(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one
hundred eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state
board of correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as

15 This principle was emphatically reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Verska.
151 Idaho at 896. Moreover, Verska did not announce a new rule, but rather, reaffirmed
the long-standing principle that the courts do not engage in any statutory interpretation
when the statute is unambiguous. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 894-96. For example,
"[w]e must follow the law as written. If it is socially or economically unsound, the power
to correct it is legislative, not judiciaL" Herndon v. West, 87 Idaho 335, 339 (1964).
Similarly, "[w]e have recognized and applied the rule of construction that where a
statute or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself
and must be given the interpretation the language clearly implies.'" Moon v. Investment
Bd. of the State of Idaho, 97 Idaho 595, 596 (1976) (quoting State v. Jonasson, 78
Idaho 205, 210 (1956».
Most pertinent, however, is the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in 1978, which
clearly prohibited the action from Deitz and its progeny upon which the Reed Court
relied (see Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04): "This Court has consistently adhered to the
primary canon of statutory construction that where the language of the statute is
unambiguous, the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect and
there is no occasion for construction." Worley Highway Dist., 98 Idaho at 928 (quoting
State v. Riley, 83 Idaho 346, 349 (1961) (emphasis added». Deitz and Reed ignored
this principle and engaged in statutory construction on an unambiguous statute, which it
was not authorized to do. See Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757-58; Reed, 149 Idaho at 902-04.
This is yet another reason that Reed should be overruled.
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provided in subsection 4. of section 19-2601,16 Idaho Code, upon
application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the
court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant
has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his
probation, the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term
in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in a
penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor
conviction.
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of
conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender
registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code. A judgment of
conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex offender
registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be
subject to dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the
purposes of this chapter means that the person has pled guilty or has
been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld
judgment. 17
I.C. § 19-2604(1), (3) (2006).18 The statute clearly reveals that the only limitations to the
relief available therein were to relief afforded pursuant to I.C. §19-2604(2). Id. (looking

16 At the time Mr. Glenn was afforded relief, I.C. § 19-2601 (4) referred to the situation
where the defendant's sentence is initially executed but is subsequently suspended
within the first one-hundred eighty days of execution. I.C. § 19-2601 (4) (2005)
(see pp.A15-A17, infra). However, Mr. Glenn's situation fell under I.C. §19-2601(2)
because his sentence was suspended "at the time judgment". See id. Therefore,
I.C. § 19-2601 (2), not I.C. § 19-2601 (4) governed Mr. Glenn's case. As such, when it
granted his motion for relief in 2007, the district court correctly held that the relief
articulated in I.C. § 19-2604(2) was not applicable to Mr. Glenn's case. (See R., p.46.)
17 I.C. § 19-2604(1) was amended in 2010, expanding the period of time during which
the district court could suspend a sentence and subsection (2) would be applicable.
2010 Idaho Laws Ch. 350 (S.B. 1383) (see pp.A22-A23, infra). It was amended again
in 2011, giving the district court the alternative to reduce the charge to a misdemeanor
in addition to the ability to fully dismiss the case. 2011 Idaho Laws Ch. 187 (H.B. 226)
(see pp.A20-A21, infra). As such, neither of the subsequent amendments support the
Reed Court's conclusion that the Deitz construction is valid or the district court's
conclusion that it is applicable to Mr. Glenn's case.
18 There were two other amendments to I.C. § 19-2604, which were passed in 2006.
The first was to subsections (1) and (2), allowing for relief to be granted when the
defendant showed that he had completed a drug or mental health court program.
2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 104 (H.B. 716) (pp.A26-A27, infra).
The second was to
subsection (3), expanding the exception therein from three specific crimes to any
offense requiring sex offender registration. 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304)
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specifically at subsection (3)).

Subsection (2) was inapplicable to Mr. Glenn's case

because he was not placed on probation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601 (4). (See note 16,

supra.) Since Subsection (2) was inapplicable to Mr. Glenn's case, the relief available
to him was unrestricted. 19
Furthermore, Subsection (1), under which Mr. Glenn would have been granted
relief, was and is unambiguously unlimited in its scope, as well as to the relief afforded:
"terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant,
and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant .... " I.C. § 19-2604(1).
And because it is unambiguous, it must be given the force and effect as written.20

Verska, 151 Idaho at 894-96; Worley Highway Dist., 98 Idaho at 928.

(pp.A24-A25, infra). However, neither amendment was applicable to Mr. Glenn's case,
nor did they restrict the relief available to him.
19 Even if I.C. § 19-2604(2) is applicable to Mr. Glenn's case, the relief available to him
was not restricted because the restriction in the statute was very specific and limited to
only those persons required to register as sex offenders pursuant to I.C. §18-8304.
I.C. § 19-2604(3) (2006) (see pp.A4-A6, infra). As a DUI did not subject Mr. Glenn to
the registration statute (see I.C. § 18-8304 (2006) (pp.A3-A4, infra), the relief available
to him, even under I.C. § 19-2604(2), was not restricted. Furthermore, he was explicitly
granted the maximum relief available by the district court. (R., pA7.) As the statute is
unambiguous in this regard, engaging in statutory interpretation to extend those relief
restrictions beyond the scope of the statute was wholly improper, and as such, Reed's
reliance on that improper interpretation reveals that Reed should be overruled.
20 Even if this Court determines that statutory interpretation is necessary, the Court of
Appeals' interpretation is revealed to be erroneous by the Legislature's own comments
in regard to these statutes. According to the Legislature, when it created the exception
to the broad relief afforded by I.C. § 19-2604 in 2006: "The purpose of this act is to
update subsection 3 to except all offenses requiring sexual offender registration as set
forth in Idaho Code 18-8304 from the dismissal or reduction of conviction provisions of
subsections 1 and 2 of the act." 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (pp.A24-A25,
infra). As the Legislature clearly indicated, it believed that relief afforded under
I.C. § 19-2604 did afford a "dismissal" of the conviction, despite the language of the
other statutes, such as I.C. § 18-8304. See id. As a result, it crafted an exception
specifically in regard to the sexual offender registration statute. See id. It did not
extend that exception to any other statutes, including I.C. § 18-8005. See id.
Therefore, even if statutory construction is necessary, that exception should not be
24

The Reed Court also believed that exceptions to § 19-2604 are built into other
statutes.

Reed, 149 Idaho at 904.

However, those other statutes presume a valid

judgment remains on the defendant's record, and I.C. §19-2604 unambiguously makes
the valid judgment and underlying event of conviction non-existent within the entire
history of the case: "[w]here a judgment has been vacated under [I.C. § 19-2604], 'it is
a nullity, and the effect is as if it had never been rendered at all." Robinson, 143 Idaho
at 308 (quoting Manners, 107 Idaho at 952 (quoting Barwick, 94 Idaho at 143))
(emphasis added). The relevant language from all three statutes upon which the Reed
Court relied is: "notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s)."
I.C. §§ 18-8005(4); 18-8005(6); 18-8304 (see pp.A2-A3, A7-A8, infra). The fact that the
Legislature was only concerned with "the form of the judgment reveals that the
Legislature presumed a valid judgment actually exists. Id. (emphasis added); see also

Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82 (holding that there needs to be valid event of conviction;

extended to areas where the Legislature did not intend the exception to apply.
See Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310.
In addition, the assertion in Deitz (upon which Reed relies) that I.C. § 18-8005
was designed to encourage rehabilitation, thus putting it at odds with I.C. § 19-2604, if
I.C. § 19-2604 is read to allow relief such as Mr. Glenn requested, is belied by the
Legislature's stated purpose for I.C. § 18-8005: "This legislation is designed to reduce
the number of motor vehicle drivers choosing to drive while under the influence of drugs
and alcohol; thereby making our roads safer for law-abiding citizens." 2006 Idaho Laws
Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397) (pp.A11-A12, infra.) It stated that it would do this only by
increasing the permissible punishments under the statute, not by affording rehabilitative
opportunities. Id. As such, the assertion in Deitz that both I.C. §§ 18-8005 and 19-2604
serve the same goals is clearly erroneous, in that it is not based on substantial and
competent evidence. See, e.g., State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2006). As such,
the Deitz Court's purported rationale to limit the relief available pursuant to I.C. § 192604 is contrary to the Legislature's stated purposes. Compare Deitz, 120 Idaho at 758
with 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397) (pp.A11-A12, infra) and 2006 Idaho Laws
Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (pp.A24-A25, infra). Therefore, Reeds reliance on this erroneous
attempt at statutory construction further demands that Reed be overruled and that
erroneous interpretation rejected.
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a mere charged violation of the terms of the statute is insufficient to support the
subsequent enhancement). It is axiomatic that a non-existent judgment is not valid.
Furthermore, other language in other sections of the Idaho Code reveal that
I.C. § 18-8005 does not contain an exception from the relief afforded pursuant to
I.C. § 19-2604. That is evident when I.C. § 18-8005 (pp.A7-A8, infra) is compared with
I.C. § 19-5109(10).

I.C. § 18-8005(9) (one example of many in that statute and the

section under which Mr. Glenn was charged) reads:
[A]ny person who has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a felony
violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code [or other
enumerated code sections], notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or
withheld judgment(s), and within fifteen (15) years pleads guilty or is found
guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho
Code, shall be guilty of a felony ....
I.C. § 18-8005(9).

However, in regard to the qualifications for membership on the

Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, the Legislature set forth an expanded
definition of the term "conviction":
As used in this section, "convicted" means a plea or finding of guilt,
notwithstanding the form of judgment or withheld judgment, regardless of
whether the sentence is imposed, suspended, deferred or withheld, and
regardless of whether the plea or conviction is set aside or withdrawn or
the case is dismissed or reduced under section 19-2604, Idaho Code, or
any other comparable statute or procedure where the setting aside of the
plea or conviction, or dismissal or reduction of the case or charge, is
based upon lenity or the furtherance of rehabilitation rather than upon any
defect in the legality or factual basis of the plea, finding of guilt or
conviction.
I.C. § 19-5109(10) (emphasis added).

This significant difference in the language

indicates that the Legislature is not only aware of the broad relief afforded under
I.C. § 19-2604, but that it did not intend that a similar exception exist in I.C. § 18-8005.

See id. Had the Legislature intended I.C. § 18-8005 to have such an exception, it would
have added language similar to that in I.C. § 19-5109(10). Because it did not, it is clear
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that when a conviction is made non-existent pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, it cannot serve
as the prerequisite conviction for an enhancement under I.C. § 18-8005.
The Court of Appeals, however, has misinterpreted the statutes to no longer
require the valid judgment or event of conviction in the defendant's record. See Deitz,
120 Idaho at 756-57; Perkins, 149 Idaho at 19;21 Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. Instead, all
three decisions allow subsequent penalties to be premised on non-existent convictions
from cases dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604.

Through its misinterpretation of

the statute, the Court of Appeals has impermissibly modified the statute to remove
the implicit requirement that a valid judgment be present on the record.

See

State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003) (discussing the separation of powers in

such situations, holding that it is the Legislature's province to modify statutes, not the
Judiciary's).
In fact, the Reed Court stated that its approach to the statute was "to ascertain
the legislative intent and give effect to that intent. To ascertain the intent of the
legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the
context of those words, the public policy behind the statute and its legislative
history .... Constructions of a statute that would lead to an absurd result are
disfavored." Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. That approach has been soundly rejected by the
Idaho Supreme Court: "The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words

21 The ultimate conclusion in Perkins has since been adopted by the Legislature through
its specific amendment of the registration statute in 2006. State v. Hardwick, 150 Idaho
580, 581 (2011); see 2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 157 (S.B. 1304) (see pp.A24-25, infra). The
fact that the Legislature has made the promoted end valid does not, however, justify the
rationale the Court of Appeals used to reach that conclusion. That rationale was
contradictory to then-existing Idaho Supreme Court precedent and has, at any rate,
been abrogated by the decision in Sharp. See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407.
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of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and
the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court
does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.'" Verska, 151 Idaho at 893
(quoting Schwartz, 139 Idaho at 362) (emphasis added). Furthermore, "where a statute
or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself and must
be given the interpretation the language clearly implies.'" Id. (quoting Moon, 97 Idaho at
596). The statute at issue here is not ambiguous, and thus, the Court of Appeals' desire
to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent is improper.
The statutes discussed herein are clear:

the conviction being relied on

must be valid and present on the defendant's record.

See, e.g., I.C. § 18-8005(9)

("[N]otwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) .... ,,).22 As that
statutory provision regarding the form of judgment is unambiguous, in that it requires a
valid conviction on the record, the statute must be given effect as written.23 See Bever,

22 While there may have initially been an ambiguity in regard to this language in
I.C. § 18-8005, the Idaho Supreme Court resolved that ambiguity in Bever. the statute
requires that valid guilty pleas or events of conviction be present in order to serve as a
predicate for the enhancement. Bever, 118 Idaho at 82. As such, the statute is no
longer ambiguous and there is no cause for further interpretation in that regard.
23 In developing its position in this regard, the Court of Appeals relied on dicta from a
1924 decision, In re France, 224 P. 433, 435 (Idaho 1924). See, e.g., Deitz, 120 Idaho
at 757-58 (quoting France, 224 P. at 435). It attempted to apply the France rationale
(that the statutory relief provisions that existed in 1924 were not designed to apply to
habitual criminals) to the modern relief statutes. Deitz, 120 Idaho at 757-58. However,
it ignored the poignant language in France: "this and other humane provisions now
generally recognized . ... " France, 224 P. at 435 (emphasis added). The France Court
clearly limited its ruling to then-existing statutes. Had the Legislature desired to limit the
applicability of relief under the broader modern relief statute (I.C. § 19-2604), it would
have included such a limitation in the language of the statute. See, e.g., Hardwick, 150
Idaho at 581. For example, the archaic statute limited relief to only those persons
who were under twenty-five years of age. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407 (discussing the
evolution of the relief statute). The modern statute, however, has no such age
restriction. See I. C. § 19-2604 (see pp.A 18-A 19, infra). Additionally, the archaic
statute only dealt with the trial court's ability to withhold judgment for a specific set of
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118 Idaho at 82. The effect of the Court of Appeals' misinterpretation (essentially
modifying the statute to eliminate that requirement) flies in the face of the constitutional
separation of powers between the Legislature and Judiciary and is wholly inappropriate.
See Verska, 151 Idaho at 896.

Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals in Reed took the

Deitz analysis one step further, claiming any such distinction between vacated and

outstanding withheld judgments had been eliminated.

Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04

(without discussing Sharp and Manners). This assertion is directly contradicted by the
Idaho Supreme Court, which obviously intended to continue to draw that distinction, or
else it would not have used the adjective "outstanding" in its holding in Sharp.
See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407 ("An outstanding withheld judgment based on a guilty plea

qualifies as a conviction under Idaho law." (emphasis added)); see also Manners, 107
Idaho at 952 (when read with Sharp, Manners affirmatively holds that only an
outstanding withheld judgment constitutes a conviction under Idaho law, but that a

vacated withheld judgment and guilty plea do not).
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected the Reed Court's
conclusion that the distinction between outstanding and vacated judgments has been
eliminated. See Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82. In Bever, the Idaho Supreme Court held
that there was a clear distinction between a record bearing only charged violations of
the statute and actual convictions under the statute. Bever, 118 Idaho at 81-82. In that
case, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the subsequent enhancement must be based

offenses. See Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407. The modern statute applies to all offenses,
except those which trigger I.C. § 18-8304. I.C. § 19-2604 (see pp.A 18-A 19, infra).
Therefore, the France rationale is inapplicable to the modern relief statute, as the
Legislature used unambiguous language to make the modern relief statute more
broadly applicable than those in existence in 1924. As such, the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of the statute in this regard was erroneous.
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on a valid determination of guilt (plea of guilty or finding of guilty). Id. When read with
Manners, the decision in Bever foreclosed the Reed Court's conclusion and established

that there is a distinction between a vacated and outstanding judgment.

See id.;

Manners, 107 Idaho at 952.

Instead of looking to the relevant Idaho Supreme Court precedent in Sharp,
Bever, and Manners (among others), the Reed Court turned to its own prior decision in
Perkins, which applied the Deitz analysis to I.C. § 18-8304(3) (A2-A3, infra), which

addresses the requirement to register as a sex offender. Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04
(citing State v. Perkins, 135 Idaho 17, 21 (Ct. App. 2000)).

The Court of Appeals

concluded that the registration requirement could be based on a vacated withheld
judgment. 24 Perkins, 135 Idaho at 22. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court pointed
out in Robinson, the reason that result was permissible was the specific language
used in § 18-8310 (which made it the only source of relief for the registration
requirement) and the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 19-2604 (pp.A4-A6, infra), which
exempted the registration requirement form the relief available under that code section.
Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310; Hardwick, 150 Idaho at 581.

Notably, the fact that the

As in Deitz, one member of the Perkins Court reminded the majority of the actual
effect of a complete setting aside of the guilty plea underlying the withheld judgment.
Perkins, 135 Idaho at 22-23 (Schwartzman, J., specially concurring).
Judge
Schwartzman pointed out that the district court in Perkins had not actually set aside
the defendant's guilty plea and only conditionally dismissed the case. Id. at 22.
Judge Schwartzman then highlighted the inherent difference between that result and a
complete dismissal of the case (including setting aside the guilty plea), and stated
that, in the latter situation (based on the statute before the 2006 amendments
(see pp.A24-A27, infra)), even the registration requirement could not be based on the
non-existent prior dismissed judgment because of the language of the statute at that
time. Id. at 22-23. The hypothetical situation Judge Schwartzman presented in his
special concurrence is identical to the facts in Mr. Glenn's case, further illustrating the
impropriety of relying on his non-existent withheld judgment to justify the subsequent
punishment. (See R., pp.77-79.)
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Legislature found it necessary to add the exemption into I.C. § 19-2604, despite the
presence of the "notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s)"
language in I.C. § 18-8304 and the Court of Appeals' 2000 decision in Perkins, indicates
that, in fact, the Legislature believed I.C. § 19-2604 offered relief which would
nullify prior convictions to the point that they could not be prerequisites to subsequent
deprivations of civil rights, including the sex offender registration requirement. Hence,
its decision to amend the statute to exempt the registration requirement from the relief
afforded by I. C. § 19-2604. This further reveals the error in the Reed Court's analysis of
the statutes in question. See Reed, 149 Idaho at 903-04.
Finally, the Reed Court looked to its own prior decision in State v. Woodbury, to
justify its conclusion. Reed, 149 Idaho at 904 (citing State v. Woodbury, 141 Idaho 547,
549 (Ct. App. 2005)). In its dicta in Woodbury, the Court of Appeals had expanded the
rationale it established in Deitz to other situations besides those previously identified,
including sentencing enhancement in domestic violence cases, and disqualifications for
concealed weapons or liquor licenses. Woodbury, 141 Idaho at 549. The Woodbury
Court did not discuss the contradictory Idaho Supreme Court decision in Manners,
which explicitly held that a license (specifically a veterinary license) could not be
revoked based on a non-existent conviction, one vacated under I. C. § 19-2604
(which also suggests that a license could not be denied based on a non-existent
conviction). See Woodbury, 141 Idaho at 548; compare Manners, 107 Idaho at 952.
The Court of Appeals also stated that convictions vacated pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604
could still serve as the prerequisite felony for enhanced punishments for DUI offenses,
even though the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Bever that there needed to be a
valid event of conviction or valid guilty plea present for that to be permissible.
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See Woodbury, 141 Idaho at 548; compare Bever, 118 Idaho at 82. As such, the dicta
from Woodbury, upon which the Reed Court relied, is clearly preempted by Idaho
Supreme Court precedent, further illustrating why Reed should be overruled.
Therefore, because the Court of Appeals' decision in Reed is clearly contradicted
by several Idaho Supreme Court cases, it should be overruled. Compare, e.g., Sharp,
145 Idaho at 407; Parkinson, 144 Idaho at 828; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310; Manners,
107 Idaho at 952; BalWick, 94 Idaho at 143; with, e.g., Reed, 149 Idaho at 904. And
because the order denying Mr. Glenn's motion to dismiss was premised on the decision
in Reed (R., pp.77-79), that order should be reversed as well, and Mr. Glenn's case
should be remanded for further proceedings.
To that end, Mr. Glenn's motion should be granted because the statute is
unambiguous (see Verska, 151 Idaho at 896), as has been established by the Idaho
Supreme Court's clear precedent: when the withheld judgment is not outstanding, but
has instead been vacated and the underlying guilty plea withdrawn, they cannot be
the basis for a subsequent penalty because, once vacated and withdrawn, they are
non-existent throughout the history of the case.

Sharp, 145 Idaho at 407; Parkinson,

144 Idaho at 828; Robinson, 143 Idaho at 310; Manners, 107 Idaho at 952; BalWick, 94
Idaho at 143.

Mr. Glenn's guilty plea was withdrawn and his withheld judgment

dismissed in its entirety.

(R., p.46.)

As such, based on the Idaho Supreme Court

precedent on point, it cannot be the basis for a subsequent sentence enhancement, and
the district court's decision allowing it to be so is in error.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Glenn respectfully requests that this Court overrule Reed, reverse the district
court's order denying his motion to dismiss, and remand his case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 26 th day of September, 20~.
//

/ /
f

/

/ /~
/_____ / //
{ J // / . / / '-_ _ _
v

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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I. C. § 18-8304

§ 18-8304. Application of chapter--rulemaking authority
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who:
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or
a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18-909 (assault with intent to
commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a
minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-911 (battery with intent to
commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a
minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-919 (sexual exploitation by a
medical care provider), 18-15058 (sexual abuse and exploitation of a vulnerable
ad ult), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A
(ritualized abuse of a child), 18-1507 (sexual exploitation of a child), 18-1508 (lewd
conduct with a minor child), 18-1508A (sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or
seventeen years of age), 18-1509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d)
(murder committed in perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, but
excluding a misdemeanor conviction), 18-4502 (first degree kidnapping committed
for the purpose of rape, committing the infamous crime against nature or for
committing any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or
for purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping
where the victim is an unrelated minor child), 18-5605 (detention for prostitution), 185609 (inducing person under eighteen years of age into prostitution), 18-5611
(inducing person under eighteen years of age to patronize a prostitute), 18-6101
(rape, but excluding 18-6101(1) where the defendant is eighteen years of age), 186108 (male rape, but excluding 18-6108(1) where the defendant is eighteen years of
age), 18-6110 (sexual contact with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 18-6605 (crime
against nature), 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object), 186609 (video voyeurism where the victim is a minor or upon a second or subsequent
conviction), 18-7804 (if the racketeering act involves kidnapping of a minor) or 188602(1), Idaho Code, (sex trafficking).
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a
solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another jurisdiction or who has a
foreign conviction that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection
(1 )(a) of this section and enters this state to establish residence or for employment
purposes or to attend, on a full-time or part-time basis, any public or private
educational institution including any secondary school, trade or professional
institution or institution of higher education.
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to
commit a crime in another jurisdiction, including military courts, that is substantially
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1 )(a) of this section and was required
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to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established
residency in Idaho.
(d) Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this chapter prior
to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county
jail facility or a penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after
July 1, 1993.
(e) Is a nonresident regularly employed or working in Idaho or is a student in the
state of Idaho and was convicted, found guilty or pleaded guilty to a crime covered
by this chapter and, as a result of such conviction, finding or plea, is required to
register in his state of residence.
(2) An offender shall not be required to comply with the registration provisions of this
chapter while incarcerated in a correctional institution of the department of correction, a
county jail facility, committed to the department of juvenile corrections or committed to a
mental health institution of the department of health and welfare.
(3) A conviction for purposes of this chapter means that the person has pled guilty or
has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment.
(4) The department shall have authority to promulgate rules to implement the provisions
of this chapter.
Credits
S.L. 1998, ch. 411, § 2; S.L. 1999, ch. 302, § 1; S.L. 1999, ch. 349, § 2; S.L. 2001, ch.
194, § 2; S.L. 2003, ch. 145, § 2; S.L. 2004, ch. 122, § 2; S.L. 2005, ch. 233, § 1; S.L.
2006, ch. 408, § 1, eff. July 1, 2006; S.L. 2009, ch. 250, § 2, eff. July 1, 2009. Amended
by S.L. 2010, ch. 352, § 7, eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 2011, ch. 27, § 2, eff. July 1, 2011;
S.L. 2011, ch. 311, § 3, eff. July 1, 2011; S.L. 2012, ch. 269, § 4, eff. July 1, 2012; S.L.
2012, ch. 271, § 1, eff. July 1, 2012.
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2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 408 (S.B. 1425)
IDAHO 2006 SESSION LAWS
SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE 59TH LEGISLATURE
Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by
~. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Vetoed provisions within tabular material are not displayed.
Ch.408
S.B. No. 1425
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT-SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AN ACT RELATING TO THE SEXUAL OFFENDER REGISTRATION NOTIFICATION
AND COMMUNITY RIGHTTO-KNOWACT; AMENDING SECTION 18-8304, IDAHO
CODE, TO EXEMPT FROM REPORTING REQUIREMENTS CERTAIN DEFENDANTS
CONVICTED OF STATUTORY RAPE AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 18-8304, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
« ID ST § 18-8304 »

§ 18-8304. Application of chapter
(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to any person who:
(a) On or after July 1, 1993, is convicted of the crime, or an attempt, a solicitation, or
a conspiracy to commit a crime provided for in section 18-909 (assault with attempt
to commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with
a minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-911 (battery with attempt to
commit rape, infamous crime against nature, or lewd and lascivious conduct with a
minor, but excluding mayhem, murder or robbery), 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child
under sixteen years of age), 18-1506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-1507 (sexual
exploitation of a child), 18-1507A (possession of sexually exploitative material for
other than a commercial purpose), 18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor child), 181508A (sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age), 181509A (enticing a child over the internet), 18-4003(d) (murder committed in
perpetration of rape), 18-4116 (indecent exposure, but excluding a misdemeanor
conviction), 18-4502 (first degree kidnapping committed for the purpose of rape,
committing the infamous crime against nature or for committing any lewd and
lascivious act upon any child under the age of sixteen, or for purposes of sexual
gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnapping where the victim is an
unrelated minor child), 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 18-6101 f1j . where the
defendant is eighteen years of age or younger or where the defendant is exempted
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under subsection (4) of this section), 18-6108 (male rape), 18-6110 (sexual contact
with a prisoner), 18-6602 (incest), 18-6605 (crime against nature), 18-6608
(forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object), or upon a second or
subsequent conviction under 18-6609, Idaho Code (video voyeurism).
(b) On or after July 1, 1993, has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a
solicitation or a conspiracy to commit a crime in another state, territory,
commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States, including tribal courts and
military courts, that is substantially equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection
(1 )(a) of this section and enters the state to establish permanent or temporary
residence.
(c) Has been convicted of any crime, an attempt, a solicitation or a conspiracy to
commit a crime in another state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the
United States, including tribal courts and military courts, that is substantially
equivalent to the offenses listed in subsection (1 )(a) of this section and was required
to register as a sex offender in any other state or jurisdiction when he established
permanent or temporary residency in Idaho.
(d) Pleads guilty to or has been found guilty of a crime covered in this chapter prior
to July 1, 1993, and the person, as a result of the offense, is incarcerated in a county
jail facility or a penal facility or is under probation or parole supervision, on or after
July 1, 1993.
(e) Is a nonresident regularly employed or working in Idaho or is a student in the
state of Idaho and was convicted, found guilty or pleaded guilty to a crime covered
by this chapter and, as a result of such conviction, finding or plea, is required to
register in his state of residence.
(2) The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any such person while the person is
incarcerated in a correctional institution of the department of correction, a county jail
facility or committed to a mental health institution of the department of health and
welfare.
(3) A conviction for purposes of this chapter means that the person has pled guilty or
has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment.
(4) When a defendant is convicted of rape under section 18-6101 1., Idaho Code, and
at the time of the offense the defendant is nineteen (19) or twenty (20) years of age and
not more than three (3) years older than the victim of the rape, the court may order that
the defendant is exempt from the requirements of this chapter upon a finding by the
court that:
(a) All parties have stipulated to the exemption; or
(b) The defendant has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is not
a risk to commit another crime identified in subsection (1) of this section and in the
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case there were no allegations by the victim of any violation of section 18-6101 2.
through 7., Idaho Code.
Approved on the 10th day of April, 2006.
Effective: July 1, 2006.
Statement of Purpose
RS16129
The purpose of this legislation is to allow an exemption for people accused of statutory
rape to avoid the sex offender registry. The exemption would only apply to defendants
nineteen or twenty years of age who are not more than three years older than the
victim.
Fiscal Note
There is no fiscal impact.
Contact Name: Senator Denton Darrington
Phone: (208) 332-1317
Name: Representative Debbie Field
Phone: (208) 332-1127
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I.C. § 18-8005

§ 18-8005. Penalties
(4) Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of
section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or
has pled guilty to a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho
Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation within ten (10) years,
notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and except as
provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and, except as
provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code:
(a) Shall be sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than ten
(10) days the first forty-eight (48) hours of which must be consecutive, and five (5)
days of which must be served in jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164, and may
be sentenced to not more than one (1) year, provided however, that in the discretion
of the sentencing judge, the judge may authorize the defendant to be assigned to a
work detail program within the custody of the county sheriff during the period of
incarceration;
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000);
(c) Shall be advised by the court in writing at the time of sentencing, of the penalties
that will be imposed for subsequent violations of the provisions of section 18-8004,
Idaho Code, which advice shall be signed by the defendant, and a copy retained by
the court and another copy retained by the prosecuting attorney;
(d) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court;
(e) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an additional
mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from confinement, during
which one (1) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be
granted; and
(f) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 18-8008,
Idaho Code, following the one (1) year mandatory license suspension period.

(6) Except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, any person who pleads guilty
to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c),
Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or
more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within ten
(10) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), shall be
guilty of a felony; and
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(a) Shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board of correction for not to
exceed ten (10) years; provided that notwithstanding the provisions of section 192601, Idaho Code, should the court impose any sentence other than incarceration in
the state penitentiary, the defendant shall be sentenced to the county jail for a
mandatory minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days, the first forty-eight (48)
hours of which must be consecutive, and ten (10) days of which must be served in
jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164; and further provided that notwithstanding
the provisions of section 18-111, Idaho Code, a conviction under this section shall
be deemed a felony;
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000);
(c) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court;
(d) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a mandatory
minimum period of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, and may have his
driving privileges suspended by the court for not to exceed five (5) years after
release from imprisonment, during which time he shall have absolutely no driving
privileges of any kind; and
(e) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 18-8008,
Idaho Code, following the mandatory one (1) year license suspension period.

(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (6) of this section, any person
who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of the provisions of
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C,
Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-8006, Idaho Code, a violation of
the provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), Idaho Code, notwithstanding the form of the
judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s) or any substantially conforming foreign criminal
felony violation, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s),
and within fifteen (15) years pleads guilty or is found guilty of a further violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall be guilty of a felony and shall be
sentenced pursuant to subsection (6) of this section.
Credits
S.L. 1984, ch. 22, § 2; S.L. 1986, ch. 201, § 1; S.L. 1988, ch. 265, § 564; S.L. 1989, ch.
88, § 62; S.L. 1989, ch. 175, § 1; S.L. 1989, ch. 366, § 2; S.L. 1990, ch. 45, § 45; S.L.
1992, ch. 115, § 40; S.L. 1992, ch. 139, § 1; S.L. 1992, ch. 338, § 1; S.L. 1993, ch. 272,
§ 1; S.L. 1994, ch. 148, § 2; S.L. 1994, ch. 421, § 2; S.L. 1994, ch. 422, § 3; S.L. 1997,
ch. 114, § 1; S.L. 1999, ch. 80, § 2; S.L. 2000, ch. 240, § 1; S.L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3; S.L.
2003, ch. 286, § 1; S.L. 2005, ch. 352, § 3; S.L. 2006, ch. 261, § 3, eff. July 1, 2006;
S.L. 2009, ch. 11, § 6, eff. July 1, 2009; S.L. 2009, ch. 184, § 5, eff. July 1, 2009.
Amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 331, § 1, eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 2011, ch. 265, § 4, eff. Jan.
1, 2012.
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2006 Idaho Laws Ch. 261 (S.B. 1397)
IDAHO 2006 SESSION LAWS
SECOND REGULAR SESSION OF THE 59TH LEGISLATURE
Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by
=HOO. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Vetoed provisions within tabular material are not displayed.
Ch.261
S.B. No. 1397
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT-INCREASED PENALTIES FOR REPEAT DUI
VIOLATORS
AN ACT RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING
SUBSTANCES; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002, IDAHO CODE, TO INCREASE
PENALTIES AND TO INCREASE THE PERIOD OF TIME APPLICABLE TO REPEAT
REFUSALS TO EVIDENTIARY TESTING; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO
CODE, TO REVISE INFORMATION TO BE GIVEN TO PERSONS SUBJECT TO
EVIDENTIARY TESTING; AMENDING SECTION 18-8005, IDAHO CODE, TO
PROVIDE CLARIFYING LANGUAGE, TO INCREASE THE PERIOD OF TIME
APPLICABLE TO REPEAT VIOLATIONS AND TO INCREASE PENALTIES; AND
AMENDING SECTION 18-8006, IDAHO CODE, TO INCREASE A PENALTY.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 3. That Section 18-8005, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
to read as follows:

« 10 ST § 18-8005 »

§ 18-8005. Penalties
(4) Any person who pleads guilty to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of
section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of
or has pled guilty to a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1 )(a), (b) or (c),
Idaho Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation within fi¥e ten (5
10) years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s), and
except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor; and,
except as provided in section 18-8004C, Idaho Code:
(a) Shall be sentenced to jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than ten
(10) days the first forty-eight (48) hours of which must be consecutive, and five (5)
days of which must be served in jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164, and may
be sentenced to not more than one (1) year, provided however, that in the discretion
of the sentencing judge, the judge may authorize the defendant to be assigned to a
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work detail program within the custody of the county sheriff during the period of
incarceration;
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed two thousand dollars ($2,000);
(c) Shall be advised by the court in writing at the time of sentencing, of the penalties
that will be imposed for subsequent violations of the provisions of section 1B-B004,
Idaho Code, which advice shall be signed by the defendant, and a copy retained by
the court and another copy retained by the prosecuting attorney;
(d) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court;
(e) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for an additional
mandatory minimum period of one (1) year after release from confinement, during
which one (1) year period absolutely no driving privileges of any kind may be
granted; and
(f) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 1B800B, Idaho Code, following the one (1) year mandatory license suspension period.

(g) If the person has pled guilty or was found guilty for the second time within five ten
(a 10) years of a violation of the provisions of section 1B-B004(1)(b) or (c), Idaho
Code, then the provisions of section 49-335, Idaho Code, shall apply.
(5) Except as provided in section 1B-B004C, Idaho Code, any person who pleads guilty
to or is found guilty of a violation of the provisions of section 1B-B004(1)(a), (b) or (c),
Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or has pled guilty to two (2) or
more violations of the provisions of section 1B-B004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any combination thereof, within
five ten (a10)years, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld
judgment(s), shall be guilty of a felony; and
(a) Shall be sentenced to the custody of the state board of correction for not to
exceed five ten (a 10)years; provided that notwithstanding the provisions of section
19-2601, Idaho Code, should the court impose any sentence other than
incarceration in the state penitentiary, the defendant shall be sentenced to the
county jail for a mandatory minimum period of not less than thirty (30) days, the first
forty-eight (4B) hours of which must be consecutive, and ten (10) days of which must
be served in jail, as required by 23 U.S.C. section 164; and further provided that
notwithstanding the provisions of section 1B-111, Idaho Code, a conviction under
this section shall be deemed a felony;
(b) May be fined an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000);
(c) Shall surrender his driver's license or permit to the court; and
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(d) Shall have his driving privileges suspended by the court for a mandatory
minimum perod of one (1) year after release from imprisonment, and may have his
driving privileges suspended by the court for not to exceed five (5) years after
release from imprisonment, during which time he shall have absolutely no driving
privileges of any kind; and
(e) Shall, while operating a motor vehicle, be required to drive only a motor vehicle
equipped with a functioning ignition interlock system, as provided in section 188008, Idaho Code, following the mandatory one (1) year license suspension period.
(6) For the purpose of computation of the enhancement period in subsections (4), (5)
and (7) of this section, the time that elapses between the date of commission of the
offense and the date the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty for the pending
offense shall be excluded. If the determination of guilt against the defendant is reversed
upon appeal, the time that elapsed between the date of the commission of the offense
and the date the defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty following the appeal shall also
be excluded.
(7) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of this section, any person
who has pled guilty or has been found guilty of a felony violation of the provisions of
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, a felony violation of the provisions of section 18-8004C,
Idaho Code, a violation of the provisions of section 18-8006, Idaho Code, a violation of
the provisions of section 18-4006 3.(b), Idaho Code, or any substantially conforming
foreign criminal felony violation, and within tefl fifteen (1 () 5) years pleads guilty or is
found guilty of a further violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho Code, shall
be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to subsection (5) of this section.

Approved on the 30th day of March, 2006.
Effective: July 1, 2006.
Statement of Purpose
RS15920
This legislation is designed to reduce the number of motor vehicle drivers
choosing to drive while under the influence of drugs and alcohol; thereby making our
roads safer for law-abiding citizens. Specifically this legislation accomplishes two things:
1. Drivers pulled-over by law enforcement officials for suspected DUI who refuse to
provide specimens for evidentiary testing: The legislation increases the potential
administrative license suspension from 180 days to one year for the first refusal and
from one year to two years for a second or more refusals within ten (increased from
five) years.
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2. For multiple DUI offenders: The legislation increases the maximum sentence a judge
may impose upon conviction for a felony DUI from five years, not to exceed to ten years
and for aggravated DUI from ten years to fifteen years. In addition, this legislation
increases the time period for charging a subsequent enhanced DUI from five years to
10 years and a felony from 10 years to fifteen years.
Fiscal Note
The fiscal impact cannot be determined as it depends on the future number of
violators and the exact ruling of the courts in each case. It is likely that there will be an
increase in the number of DUI violators that will be impacted by this legislation.
Accordingly, this legislation will likely have the fiscal effect of increasing the costs of
local and state law enforcement, prosecution, jail, courts and prisons. However, it will
likely have a positive fiscal impact because it should decrease citizen and taxpayer
costs associated with the injury and death of our law-abiding citizens as they travel on
our roads.
Contact Persons:
Representative Rich Wills (208-332-1218 [sic]
Senator Hal Bunderson, (208) 332-1320
Heather Riley, Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys (208) 287-7700
Mike Kane, Idaho Sheriffs Association (208) 342-4545
Aleshea Lind, MADD (208) 853-3700
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I.C. § 19-2601

§ 19-2601. Commutation, suspension, withholding of sentence--Probation
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district
court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, except those
of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may:
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, if the
defendant is of proper age, commit the defendant to the custody of the state department
of juvenile corrections; or
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time during
the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the defendant on probation under
such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient; or
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may
place the defendant on probation; or
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first three hundred
sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction. The
court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for a period of up to the first three
hundred sixty-five (365) days or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches
twenty-one (21) years of age. During the period of retained jurisdiction, the state board
of correction shall be responsible for determining the placement of the prisoner and
such education, programming and treatment as it determines to be appropriate. The
prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed on
probation by the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes that it
is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the period of retained
jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a hearing is required and is unable to
obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing within such period, the court may
decide whether to place the defendant on probation or release jurisdiction within a
reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the period of retained jurisdiction
has expired. Placement on probation shall be under such terms and conditions as the
court deems necessary and expedient. The court in its discretion may sentence a
defendant to more than one (1) period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has
been placed on probation in a case. In no case shall the board of correction or its agent,
the department of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to a
recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of probation. Probation is a matter
left to the sound discretion of the court. Any recommendation made by the department
to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature of an addendum to the
presentence report. The board of correction and its agency, the department of
correction, and their employees shall not be held financially responsible for damages,
injunctive or declaratory relief for any recommendation made to the district court under
this section.
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5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as provided in
subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of custody to the state board
of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in accordance with subsection 2. of
this section or as provided by subsection 4. of this section and the court shall place the
defendant upon probation, it shall be to the board of correction, to a county juvenile
probation department, or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion, deems
appropriate.
6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, or if the court should
suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already commuted in accordance with
subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it grants probation, may place the defendant on
probation. If the convicted person is a juvenile held for adult criminal proceedings, the
court may order probation under the supervision of the county's juvenile probation
department.
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a conviction or
plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may be for a period of not
more than two (2) years; provided that the court may extend the period of probation to
include the period of time during which the defendant is a participant in a problem
solving court program and for a period of up to one (1) year after a defendant's
graduation or termination from a problem solving court program. Under a conviction or
plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not more than
the maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned.
Credits
S.L. 1972, ch. 336, § 9; S.L. 1972, ch. 381, § 16; S.L. 1973, ch. 292, § 1; S.L. 1974, ch.
68, § 1; S.L. 1980, ch. 176, § 1; S.L. 1994, ch. 33, § 1; S.L. 1995, ch. 247, § 1; S.L.
1996, ch. 418, § 1; S.L. 1998, ch. 67, § 1; S.L. 2000, ch. 246, § 1; S.L. 2005, ch. 186, §
1. Amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 350, § 1, eft. July 1,2010; S.L. 2012, ch. 46, § 1, eft. July
1,2012.
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2005 Idaho Laws Ch. 186 (H.B. 204)
IDAHO 2005 SESSION LAWS
FIRST REGULAR SESSION OF THE 58TH LEGISLATURE
Additions are indicated by Text; deletions by
+ext. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Vetoed provisions within tabular material are not displayed.
Ch.186
H.B. No. 204
COURTS-JURISDICTION
AN ACT RELATING TO COURT JURISDICTION; AMENDING SECTION 19-2601,
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES THE
COURT MAY DECIDE WHETHER TO PLACE A DEFENDANT ON PROBATION OR
RELEASE JURISDICTION WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY DAY PERIOD OF RETAINED JURISDICTION HAS EXPIRED.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2601, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
to read as follows:

« 10 ST § 19-2601 »
19-2601. COMMUTATION,
PROBATION.

SUSPENSION, WITHHOLDING

OF SENTENCE -

Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district
court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, except those
of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may:
1. Commute the sentence and confine the defendant in the county jail, or, if the
defendant is of proper age, commit the defendant to the custody of the state department
of juvenile corrections; or
2. Suspend the execution of the judgment at the time of judgment or at any time during
the term of a sentence in the county jail and place the defendant on probation under
such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient; or
3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may prescribe and may
place the defendant on probation; or
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one hundred
eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction. The
court shall retain jurisdiction over the prisoner for the first one hundred eighty (180) days
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or, if the prisoner is a juvenile, until the juvenile reaches twenty-one (21) years of age.
The prisoner will remain committed to the board of correction if not affirmatively placed
on probation by the court. In extraordinary circumstances, where the court concludes
that it is unable to obtain and evaluate the relevant information within the one hundred
eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction, or where the court concludes that a
hearing is required and is unable to obtain the defendant's presence for such a hearing
within such period, the court may decide whether to place the defendant on probation or
release jurisdiction within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty (30) days, after the one
hundred eighty (180) day period of retained jurisdiction has expired. Placement on
probation shall be under such terms and conditions as the court deems necessary and
expedient. The court in its discretion may sentence a defendant to more than one (1)
period of retained jurisdiction after a defendant has been placed on probation in a case.
In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department of correction, be
required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to a recommendation to the court for
the grant or denial of probation. Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the
court. Any recommendation made by the department to the court regarding the prisoner
shall be in the nature of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of
correction and its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall not
be held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief for any
recommendation made to the district court under this section.
5. If the crime involved is a felony and if judgment is withheld as provided in
subsection 3. of this section or if judgment and a sentence of custody to the state board
of correction is suspended at the time of judgment in accordance with subsection 2. of
this section or as provided by subsection 4. of this section and the court shall place the
defendant upon probation, it shall be to the board of correction, to a county juvenile
probation department, or any other person or persons the court, in its discretion, deems
appropriate.

6. If the crime involved is a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, or if the court should
suspend any remaining portion of a jail sentence already commuted in accordance with
subsection 1. of this section, the court, if it grants probation, may place the defendant on
probation. If the convicted person is a juvenile held for adult criminal proceedings, the
court may order probation under the supervision of the county's juvenile probation
department.
7. The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under a conviction or
plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise, may be for a period of not
more than two (2) years; and under a conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period
of probation may be for a period of not more than the maximum period for which the
defendant might have been imprisoned.
Approved on the 28th day of March, 2005.
Effective: July 1, 2005.
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Statement of Pu rpose
RS14873
This bill is intended to resolve the uncertainty that now exists as to when a
sentencing court can make a decision as to whether to place a defendant on probation
following a period of retained jurisdiction.
Idaho Code § 19-2601 (4) provides that a sentencing court can retain jurisdiction
over a defendant for 180 days, and that at any time during that period the court may
place the defendant on probation. In State v. Diggie, 140 Idaho 238, 91 P.3d 1142 (Ct.
App. 2004), the Court of Appeals reaffirmed that a sentencing court loses jurisdiction
over a defendant and may no longer place the defendant on probation when the 180day period expires. The Court went on to say, however, "We deem it unnecessary to
hold in this case that a sentencing court may never make a decision to place a
defendant on probation within a reasonable time after the 180-day period of retained
jurisdiction has expired where extraordinary circumstances exist that may explain or
justify court action beyond the statutorily established period." 91 P.3d at 1145.
This bill would provide that a court that has retained jurisdiction may place a
defendant on probation after the 180-day period has expired only where extraordinary
circumstances exist that prevent the court from obtaining needed information or
securing the defendant's presence for a hearing. Even then, the 180-day period could
be extended only for 30 days. This would resolve the existing uncertainty in the law and
provide some leeway for sentencing courts in the small number of cases where such
extraordinary circumstances are present.
Fiscal Note
This bill would have no impact on the general fund.
Contact Person:
Patricia Tobias Administrative Director of the Courts (208) 334-2246
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I.C. § 19-2604

§ 19-2604. Discharge of defendant--Amendment of judgment
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld,
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that:
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized
drug court program or mental health court program and during any period of
probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court did not
find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the
defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation;
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for
continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest,
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant or may amend the judgment of
conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement in
a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. This shall apply to the
cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by the court
before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant
to his civil rights.
(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended for any period during the first three
hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of
correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of
section 19-2601, Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that:
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized
drug court program or mental health court program and during any period of
probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court did not
find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the
defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation;
the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state
board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served
prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor
conviction.
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(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 188304, Idaho Code. A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the
form of the judgment or withheld judgment.
Credits
S.L. 1915, ch. 104, § 1; S.L. 1919, ch. 134, § 2; S.L. 1951, ch. 99, § 1; S.L. 1970, ch.
143, § 4; S.L. 1971, ch. 97, § 2; S.L. 1989, ch. 305, § 1; S.L. 2006, ch. 104, § 1, eff. July
1, 2006; S.L. 2006, ch. 157, § 1, eff. July 1, 2006. Amended by S.L. 2010, ch. 350, § 2,
eff. July 1, 2010; S.L. 2011, ch. 187, § 1, eff. July 1, 2011.
Codifications: C.L. 1919, § 8002; C.S. 1919, § 9046; I.C.A. § 19-2506.
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2011 Idaho Laws Ch. 187 (H.B. 226)
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Ch.187
H.B. No. 226
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION
AN ACT RELATING TO SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE;
AMENDING SECTION 19-2604, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE PROVISIONS RELATING
TO THE DISCHARGE OF DEFENDANT AND THE AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
to read as follows:
« 10 ST § 19-2604 »

§ 19-2604. Discharge of defendant--Amendment of judgment
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld,
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on
probation, :
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized
drug court program or mental health court program and has at all times complied
'Nith the terms and conditions of probation during any period of probation that may
have been served following such graduation, the court did not find, and the
defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation;
the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer cause for
continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public interest,
terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and
finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant~ or may amend the judgment
of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to "confinement
in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and the amended
judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction. Tt--his shall apply to the
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cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by the court
before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final
dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant
to his civil rights.
(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended for any period during the first three
hundred sixty-five (365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of
correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of
section 19-2601, Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that tAe
defendant has at all times complied ,<,\lith the terms and conditions of his probation, :
(a) The court did not find, and the defendant did not admit, in any probation violation
proceeding that the defendant violated any of the terms or conditions of probation; or
(b) The defendant has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized
drug court program or mental health court program and has at all times complied
with the terms and conditions of his probation during any period of probation that
may have been served following such graduation, the court did not find, and the
defendant did not admit, in any probation violation proceeding that the defendant
violated any of the terms or conditions of probation;
the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state
board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served
prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor
conviction.
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 188304, Idaho Code. A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the
form of the judgment or withheld judgment.
Approved on the 5th day of April, 2011.
Effective: July 1, 2011.
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Ch.350
S.B. No. 1383
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION-JUDGMENTS AND
DECREES
AN ACT RELATING TO THE SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE;
AMENDING SECTION 19-2601, IDAHO CODE, TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF TIME
THE COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER A PRISONER AND TO PROVIDE
THAT THE STATE BOARD OF CORRECTION SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE PLACEMENT, EDUCATION, PROGRAMMING
AND TREATMENT OF PRISONERS DURING THE PERIOD OF RETAINED
JURISDICTION; AND AMENDING SECTION 19-2604, IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE
PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 2. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
to read as follows:

« 10 ST § 19-2604 »

§ 19-2604. Discharge of defendant-Amendment of judgment
(1) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld,
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on
probation, or has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized drug court
program or mental health court program and has at all times complied with the terms
and conditions of probation during any period of probation that may have been served
following such graduation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is
no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by
the court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The
final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the
defendant to his civil rights.
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(2) If sentence has been imposed but suspended for any period during the first eAe
three hundred eighty sixty-five (t80 365) days of a sentence to the custody of the state
board of correction, and the defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection
4. of section 19-2601, Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting
attorney, or upon the court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the
defendant has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, or
has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized drug court program or
mental health court program and has at all times complied with the terms and conditions
of probation during any period of probation that may have been served following such
graduation, the court may amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody
of the state board of correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of
days served prior to suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a
misdemeanor conviction.
(3) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a
violation of any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 188304, Idaho Code. A judgment of conviction for a violation of any offense requiring sex
offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, shall not be subject to
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the
form of the judgment or withheld judgment.
Approved on the 12th day of April, 2010.
Effective: July 1, 2010.
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Ch. 157
S.B. No. 1304
CRIMES AND OFFENSES-SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDING SECTION 19-2604,
IDAHO CODE, TO SET FORTH PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO JUDGMENTS FOR
OFFENSES REQUIRING SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION, TO CLARIFY THE
TERM "CONVICTION" AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
to read as follows:
« 10 ST § 19-2604»

19-2604. Discharge of defendant-amendment of judgment
(1)7 If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld,
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on
probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no longer
cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the public
interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by
the court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The
final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the
defendant to his civil rights.
(2)-: If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one hundred aM
eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, and the
defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of section 19-2601,
Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the
court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times
complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, the court may amend the
judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of correction to
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"confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to suspension, and
the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor conviction.
(3)-: Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a
violation of the provisions of sections 18 1506, 18 1507 or 18 1508 any offense
requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code. A
judgment of conviction for a violation of the provisions of any section listed in this
subsection any offense requiring sex offender registration as set forth in section 188304, Idaho Code, shall not be expunged from a person's criminal record subject to
dismissal or reduction under this section. A conviction for the purposes of this chapter
means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the
form of the judgment or withheld judgment.
Approved on the 22nd day of March, 2006.
Effective: July 1, 2006.
Statement of Purpose
RS15656
The purpose of this act is to update subsection 3 to except all offenses requiring
sexual offender registration as set forth in Idaho Code 18-8304 from the dismissal or
reduction of conviction provisions of subsections 1 and 2 of the act. The act presently
only prohibits judicial dismissal or reduction of the conviction to a misdemeanor for
sexual offenders convicted of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16)
years, Idaho Code 18-1506, sexual exploitation of a child, Idaho Code 18-1507, and
lewd conduct with a minor child under sixteen (16), Idaho Code 18-1508. Sexual
offenders are often compliant with probation conditions but continue to present a
significant risk of recidivism. Efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their
communities by identifying past offenders, conduct investigations, and quickly
apprehend the offender who commits a successive sexual offense, are impaired so long
as some sexual offenders are able to have their convictions dismissed or reduced to a
misdemeanor. This amendment will assist law enforcement in the protection of children
and other potential victims and afford a much-needed added measure of protection to
Idaho citizens.
Fiscal Note
This bill has no fiscal impact.
Contact Name: William A. von Tagen Office of the Attorney General
Phone: 334-4140
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Ch. 104
H.B. No. 716
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DISCHARGE-MEDICAL CARE AND TREATMENT
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDING SECTION 19-2604,
IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE THAT A DEFENDANT MAY BE DISCHARGED OR A
JUDGMENT AMENDED UPON A SHOWING RELATING TO THE DEFENDANT'S
GRADUATION FROM A DRUG COURT PROGRAM OR MENTAL HEALTH COURT
PROGRAM AND COMPLIANCE WITH ANY APPLICABLE PROBATION TERMS AND
CONDITIONS AND TO MAKE TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 19-2604, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby amended
to read as follows:

« ID ST § 19-2604 »
19-2604. Discharge of defendant-amendment of judgment
(17) If sentence has been imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld,
upon application of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has
at all times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on
probation, or has successfully completed and graduated from an authorized drug court
program or mental health court program and has at all times complied with the terms
and conditions of probation during any period of probation that may have been served
following such graduation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is
no longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible with the
public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the
defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge the defendant; and this shall
apply to the cases in which defendants have been convicted and granted probation by
the court before this law goes into effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The
final dismissal of the case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the
defendant to his civil rights.
(27) If sentence has been imposed but suspended during the first one hundred eighty
(180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, and the
defendant placed upon probation as provided in subsection 4. of section 19-2601,
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Idaho Code, upon application of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney, or upon the
court's own motion, and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all times
complied with the terms and conditions of his probation, or has successfully completed
and graduated from an authorized drug court program or mental health court program
and has at all times complied with the terms and conditions of probation during any
period of probation that may have been served following such graduation, the court may
amend the judgment of conviction from a term in the custody of the state board of
correction to "confinement in a penal facility" for the number of days served prior to
suspension, and the amended judgment may be deemed to be a misdemeanor
conviction.
(3-;-) Subsection (2) of this section shall not apply to any judgment of conviction for a
violation of the provisions of section 18-1506, 18-1507 or 18-1508, Idaho Code. A
judgment of conviction for a violation of the provisions of any section listed in this
subsection shall not be expunged from a person's criminal record.
Approved on the 22nd day of March, 2006.
Effective: July 1, 2006.
Statement of Purpose
RS16065
Under Idaho Code 19-2604, criminal defendants who are placed on probation
may have their convictions set aside if: (1) they have "at all times complied with the
terms and conditions' of probation; (2) there is no longer cause for continuing probation;
and (3) terminating probation and setting aside the conviction is compatible with the
public interest. Similarly, defendants who are placed on retained jurisdiction (a "rider")
and subsequently receive probation may have their felony convictions reduced to
misdemeanors if they have "at all times complied with the terms and conditions" of
probation. This bill would allow graduates of drug courts and mental health courts to
seek the relief provided by this statute if they successfully complete the drug court or
mental health court program and comply with all conditions of probation following their
graduation. The persons admitted to drug court and mental health court have often
committed violations of probation prior to their admission; in many cases, it is precisely
those violations that lead to their admission to drug court and mental health court, and
thus provide them with an opportunity to confront their problems and turn their lives
around. Allowing these persons to have their convictions set aside or reduced following
a completely satisfactory performance in drug court or mental health court would
provide them with an added performance incentive and would enhance the
effectiveness of these courts.
Fiscal Note
This bill would have no impact on the general fund.
Contact Name: Patricia Tobias, Administrative Director of the Courts
Phone:(208) 334-2246
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